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John Henshaw

Author, Naval History

The likely consequences of Britain not declaring war against Germany in 1914

 

In August 1914, Europe was smouldering.

German unification in 1871 was boosted by the 1879 alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire joined by Italy in 1882 thus forming the Triple Alliance, a powerful bloc and altering the balance of power in Europe. The growing strength and influence of Germany resulted in France and Russia entering an alliance in 1893. While Britain had viewed France and Russia as potential enemies, and not Germany to which it had familial ties, Britain started negotiating agreements with France and Russia in 1904 and in 1907 formed the Triple Entente. This alliance was more in France and Russia’s interest than Great Britain’s because France and Russia guaranteed each other that if one was attacked by Germany then the other would come to its aid. Britain was free to act independently as it saw fit. Germany felt that the Triple Entente was an existential threat and allied itself more strongly with Austria-Hungary.

To illustrate how the Triple Entente was variously interpreted, in 1911 Britain supported France’s deployment of troops in Morocco – the Agadir crisis. During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, France supported Russia to the point where if war broke out between Austria and Serbia, France would regard that in the same way as if it was an attack on its ally, Russia. On the other hand, Britain and Germany came to a mutually satisfactory end to the naval arms race, relaxed their colonial rivalries and improved diplomatic relations.

But Europe went from smouldering to a blazing inferno in a matter of thirty-seven days.

The sequence of events was:

  • the assassination in Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria (presumptive heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne) by Serbian nationalists (28 June),
  • Germany’s “blank cheque,” unconditional support of Austria-Hungary’s dispute with Serbia (July 6),
  • Austria-Hungary’s impossible ten-demands-ultimatum to Serbia (23 July),
  • Russia’s support of Serbia and mobilisation (24-25 July),
  • Serbia’s rejection all but one of the ten demands (25-28 July),
  • Austria’s breaking off of diplomatic relations with Serbia (25 July) and Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia (28 July),
  • Russian extension of mobilisation (29-30 July),
  • Germany’s ultimatum to Russia demanding it demobilises (31 July),
  • Germany’s mobilisation and declaration of war on Russia and France (1-3 August),
  • Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium (4 August)
  • Britain’s ultimatum to Germany to withdraw, which is rejected, (11pm GMT, 4 August) followed by Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. Britain could, quite reasonably, have stayed out of the conflict but Britain chose to honour its agreement to defend neutral Belgium, especially after the news of alleged German atrocities there.

It would be another 1,560 days before what became known, at the time, as the Great War ended.

But, consider, what if Britian had not declared war on 4 August, 1914?

 In 1870-71 Britian had not intervened in the Franco-Prussian war which ultimately saw Paris in Prussian hands. Britain had a maritime empire and followed a policy not to get involved with European matters because it had no territorial interests there. The British parliament was divided on whether to get involved in a war with Germany. However, Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary – a noted Francophile – exceeded his office and earlier made a secret arrangement for Britain to come to France’s aid in the event of a repeat of 1870-71. Britain also had an agreement dating from 1839 to come to Belgium’s aid. But, did honouring this agreement justify a war with Europe’s dominant power? What if Britain had considered honour less important than pragmatism? What would have been the likely consequences?

First, let’s take a look at some “what ifs.”

What if;

1.        Austria had not sought to punish Serbia for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

  1.  Austria simply recognised Serbia’s acceptance of 9 of the 10 demands as vindication?
  2. Czar Nicholas had rescinded the order for Russia’s mobilisation?
  3. Germany had not mobilised?
  4. Grey’s proposal had been accepted to convene a six-power conference like the one that settled the 1913 Balkan crisis?
  5. Grey had made it clear to the German ambassador in London that Britain would likely be drawn into a European war?

I think we can say, safely, that there would not have been a Great War that lasted for 51 months, consumed some 700,000 British war deaths and some 200,000 from the Dominions, India and the colonies.

Britain had, for one hundred years, stayed out of Continental intrigues and squabbles. Its empire was world-wide, with the exception only of Continental Europe, and it comprised one-quarter of the world’s land mass with one-fifth of its population. Britain had no interests in Europe. Had there been a repeat of the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War in 1914, the end result this time may well have been the same via German implementation of the Schlieffen Plan. Or, there might have been a stalemate of an armistice. France had a population of 39 million and an army at least the size of Germany with a population of 70 million. So, who was the more militaristic?

 

What’s the worst that could have happened for Britain? Germany as the pre-eminent power in Europe with its empire mainly grounded in Continental Europe, a mixed bag of overseas possessions of little importance and a High Seas Fleet that was of no great consequence to the Royal Navy. Remember, the Royal Navy in 1914 was equal in size to the two greatest fleets combined. Britannia did, indeed, rule the waves.

What would have been the upside?

  • No Great War as such.
  • Therefore, no need for a Treaty of Versailles.
  • No creation of new European states like Poland, Czechoslovakia for example and no re-alignment of existing borders all resulting from the Treaty of Versailles.
  • No immediate war with Russia probably deferring at best, or removing at worst, the Russian Revolution and the overthrow of the Romanovs.
  • A Russo-German war leading to the dismantling of the Russian Empire was one in which it would be in Britain’s interest for Germany to pay the cost.
  • No dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
  • No dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
  • No discontent in Germany resulting in the rise of fascism and Hitler.
  • No near-bankruptcy of the UK.
  • No decline in the British Empire.
  • No move towards independence for its many colonies.
  • No great change in the USA’s economy due to the absence of the stimulus provided by the Great War.
  • No need for Britain to provide a guarantee to Poland in 1939.
  • No reed for World War II.
  • A stable and prosperous Europe.
  • A stable and developing South East Asia.
  • Germany a bulwark to Russian expansion.
  • No Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
  • Probably no stimulation, or at least a delayed requirement, for atomic weapons.

I’d like your thoughts on this.

 

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